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### IST NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

October 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PACKARD

SUBJECT: Organization of the NRO

This memorandum is intended as a brief summary of how the NRO is organized internally and how we work in theory and in fact.

You are, of course, very familiar with the external organizational environment. I have attached, for your reference, a sketch of that arrangement (Figure 1). From our point of view, the operation is, in fact, much in accord with that diagram. Intelligence collection requirements and priorities are provided us by a single entity, the USIB, and I expect our performance to be judged in terms of our satisfaction of these requirements. Obviously, we cannot satisfy all the stated needs and USIB by its nature is not in a position to weigh adequately the trades in terms of costs and schedules. While I feel that the mechanism for bringing issues of resource allocation to your consideration with the Executive Committee is adequate in the main, I am far from satisfied and I intend to improve it considerably in the near future.

My internal NRO organization is sketched in Figure 2. I have indicated there the numbers of government people assigned full time in these activities. (We are also supported by 226 people at the Aerospace Corporation.) My line deputy is Bob Naka who supports me directly in all NRO matters. He is a CIA employee and I expect him to pay particular attention to CIA programs and to spend a significant portion of his time working in depth with the CIA. Dr. Naka represents the NRO on a number of OSD study groups currently active in our areas and is presently assessing for me the utilization of the

EALL OP TAGBOARD IDEALIST

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U-2 aircraft. Harry Davis is not shown on the chart but spends a portion of his time insuring that technology and system developments in normal Air Force channels and in the NRO are related as necessary.

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Our Comptroller, is also Mr. Schedler's deputy
for Air Force programs and budgets, and in this capacity reviews
Air Force budgets and funding and is involved in normal DOD program
processes. In the NRO, has complete responsibility for
the financial management of the NRP. He has no backup support in
the Pentagon. For the NRP has introduced several
management innovations to assure positive program control, but yet
permit an adaptable, responsive approach to managing the Program.

My NRO Staff numbers approximately 70 people. About 40 of these are assigned to the NRO Satellite Operations Center (SOC) in the basement of the Pentagon. This Center is responsible for our day-to-day working relations with the committees and subcommittees of USIB. They meet with these groups regularly and participate in the formulation of collection requirements. Once these are established, the Satellite Operations Center is responsible for translating the requirements into specific target locations and priorities and for issuing the necessary tasking guidance to our operating organization on the West Coast. The SOC receives intelligence needs daily and optimizes satellite operations against needs. Both during and after a mission the successful collection is accounted and an adjustment to priorities is made immediately. I believe that this portion of the operation is remarkably responsive, direct and effective.

The remainder of the Staff performs more normal staff activities. Implementation of the established policies in security control and interagency affairs is a major staff activity, as is program cognizance, budget preparation and program analyses. I am satisfied with the way my Staff operates in many areas. I still feel there is room for a major improvement in the way in which we draft issues for your consideration in the Executive Committee. Our shortcomings are caused, in part, by the rigid separation of requirements (USIB) and programs (NRO). An improved capability for systems analysis to illuminate the trades in cost and value would help; and, as I have mentioned previously, I am establishing such a capability within the Staff. I have in mind a group





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of about five people. Bob Naka is just completing his interviews and we expect to have some of the people on board within the next few weeks. We are planning to staff this group with people from CIA, Navy, Army, Air Force and perhaps NSA. Our first effort, by two of this group already available on the Staff, was a study of the follow-on issues which we discussed in the August Ex Com. This same cadre of the analysis group is now laying out the FY 1971 budget issues, with particular attention to possible reductions in the SIGINT area, in preparation for the November Ex Com.

There is a limit as to how far my Staff should go in attempting to evaluate intelligence worth, and I think we must rely on the USIB and DOD structure. We will evaluate alternative means of collection with their costs and risks using value judgments prepared by the intelligence community. In some cases I believe that USIB judgments are objective and appropriate. I wonder whether the very large program involvement of the CIA sometimes may cause USIB judgments to be influenced by the judgment of CIA people, who naturally favor those systems which are the responsibility of the CIA. The separation of the NRO from the DIA, conversely, does not appear to cause DIA to have any organizational bias with regard to NRP alternatives.

I am also using an "ad hoc study group" approach on particular issues. For example, I had Bob Naka look into the question of HEXAGON vs. an additional CORONA buy.

Several of our Staff people are currently participating in a number of DDR&E studies -- on ELINT resources, on vulnerable reconnaissance and intelligence collectors, on the value of resolution, SALT verification, and technology for

As you know, we also have an "overseer" group (General Bill King, John Crowley and Captain Bob Geiger) who follow closely our effort in near real time readout and report its progress to the Ex Com.

Brigadier General Bill King is the Director of Program A. His overt title is Director of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. He deals primarily with satellite photographic and SIGINT reconnaissance, including systems readiness and checkout, launching, orbital control, and recovery of payload capsules.



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General King is supported extensively by the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Organization. As a deputy commander of SAMSO, he has direct command and control authority over all elements involved in the program — a launch base force of some 400 people at both Vandenberg Air Force Base and Patrick Air Force Base; the Air Force world-wide satellite control network; and the data reentry vehicle recovery forces in Hawaii. During any particular mission all range and support facilities are singularly responsive to his direction. The Program A group is very effective in program management. They are decoupled from the intelligence community and rely on Staff guidance in intelligence evaluation and in the assessment of performance or trades.

Carl Duckett is the Director of CIA Reconnaissance Programs and has responsibilities in both aircraft and satellite reconnaissance; his satellite activities are in an Office of Special Projects (CIA/OSP) headed by John Crowley; his aircraft activity is handled by the Office of Special Activities (CIA/OSA) under Air Force Brigadier General Don Ross; ELINT/COMINT equipment and ECM systems are developed by the Office of ELINT (CIA/OEL) under George Miller. This group provides some covert contractual and procurement functions, and conducts assigned research and development efforts for both aircraft and satellite reconnaissance projects. This group, in contrast to Program A, is an element of the intelligence community and is typified by an exceptional understanding of intelligence needs and values. On the other hand, they exhibit less skill in their attention to system management and cost control. I am working to improve cost management of the CIA programs. Bob Naka is devoting a good deal of his time working very closely with CIA in this area.

NRO Program C is responsible for providing the POPPY signal intelligence payload. The work is carried on principally in-house at the Naval Research Laboratory. The technical competence of this group is exceptionally high. The POPPY payload has been one of our more effective collectors -- so long-lived that we may begin to question the need for additional vehicles. I am impressed with the capabilities of this group and am examining the possibility of using their capability on perhaps another project.



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Program D manages the TAGBOARD drone aircraft system and the SAC U-2 aircraft program. They also manage the SANDY HOOK drone project. This group directs the activity of some 144 people at two Air Force depots in support of all U-2 activity, the TAGBOARD drone, and several NRO satellite programs.

I believe that the NRO is properly organized for the present. I anticipate some changes as programs evolve and as I implement certain needed improvements. We have the ability to manage our program within ExCom guidance. My Staff can examine system alternatives and evaluate technical options. I am satisfied to cooperate with the several OSD studies underway which examine the worth of certain intelligence data and which examine the intelligence value of the collection systems of other organizations in comparison with those of the NRO. When the needed information relates to evaluation of alternate collection platforms for overflight of denied areas, I believe we can and should do the job in cooperation with the intelligence community.

McLucas

Attachments



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


Figure 1

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### NATIONAL RECOMMAISSANCE OFFICE

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NRO Comptro		NRO Staff Col Allen
PROGRAM A B/G King 279*		CIA Reconnaissance Programs (DD/S & T)  Mr Duckett  475
PROGRAM C R/A Harlfinger  188		PROGRAM D  Col Hartley  14**

\*Plus an approximate 1900 equivalent man years from supporting Air Force resources.

\*\*Plus an additional 144 equivalent man years from supporting Air Force resources.

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<del>IOP SECRET</del> Figure 2

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

#### **MEMORANDUM**

October 10, 1969

#### MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ALLEN

See Dr. McLucas' comments on Bill Yost's buck slip.

Dr. McLucas said he hadn't had a chance to discuss this with you and wants to be sure that your comments as well as Dr. McLucas' comments and thoughts get included. The one other area that may be a little thin in treatment is a discussion of the launch process and support.

Colonel, USAF Executive Assistant

# DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

#### **MEMORANDUM**

October 9, 1969

DR. McLUCAS

We have retyped the memo for Mr. Packard in accordance with your corrections. It is attached for your signature.

WILLIAM R. YOST Colonel, USAF

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### . THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

September 26, 1969

### MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ALLEN

Please prepare for me a letter to Mr. Packard showing how our office is set up, how your office is organized, what Ed Sweeney does, how SP and OSP(?) operate and how many people are at each facility. Also how AF supports us at launch time.

Please hold to three pages - more or less.

John L. McLucas